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Introduction
The notion of proxy signatures for the first time was introduced by Mambo et al. [1] in 1996. In a proxy signature scheme, an original signer, Alice, can delegate her signing right for signing messages to another signer, Bob, called the proxy signer. Since the notion of proxy signatures has been introduced, several variants of proxy signatures have been proposed. These include proxy signatures from RSA and integer factorization problem [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] , identity-based proxy signature schemes based on the bilinear pairings [8] [9] [10] [11] [12] [13] [14] [15] , designated verifier proxy signatures [16] [17] [18] , short proxy signatures [19] , proxy verifiably encrypted signatures [20] , proxy signature schemes without random oracles [21] , multi-proxy signatures [22] [23] [24] , proxy multi-signatures [23] , multi-proxy multi-signatures [25, 26] , identity-based multi-proxy signatures [13, [27] [28] [29] , identity-based proxy multi-signatures [28, [30] [31] [32] [33] and identity-based multi-proxy multi-signature schemes [28, [34] [35] [36] [37] . In this study, we focus on identity-based multi-proxy signature, proxy multi-signature and multi-proxy multi-signature schemes.
In a multi-proxy signature scheme, an original signer can delegate her signing right for signing messages to a group of n-proxy signers, called the proxy agent, such that only cooperation of all proxy signers in the proxy group generates the proxy signatures of roughly the same size as that of standard proxy signatures on behalf of the original signer instead of transmitting n individual proxy signatures. This primitive can be used in a company when the boss of the company is on a business trip and some important documents have to be signed. Hence, the boss delegates her signing capability to every department manager of the company such that only all managers jointly can sign important documents on behalf of the boss. Various multi-proxy signatures [22] [23] [24] have been proposed till now.
In a proxy multi-signature scheme [23] , a proxy signer can generate the signature on behalf of a group of d-original signers, called original group, such that only the cooperation of all the original signers in the original group can authorize the proxy signer to generate a proxy signature of roughly the same size as that of a standard proxy signature on behalf of the original group instead of transmitting d individual proxy signatures. This primitive can be used where a company releases a document which needs to be signed by different managers of that company. These managers can authorize an entity, a proxy signer, to generate proxy multi-signatures on the document when these managers cannot participate in generating signatures.
Similarly, it is possible to extend the two previous signatures to multi-proxy multi-signature in which a group of original signers gives signing delegation to a group of proxy signers to generate signatures on messages on behalf of the original signers. However, a verifier still needs the certified public keys of n + 1 signers in a multi-proxy signature, d + 1 signers in a proxy multi-signature and n + d signers in a multiproxy multi-signature to verify the validity of these signatures. If these public keys and their certificates are transmitted with these signatures, it defeats the main purpose of a multi-proxy signature, proxy multisignature or multi-proxy multi-signature, to save bandwidth. On the other hand, these kinds of schemes in their basic formats require extensive public-key infrastructure for practical use. In order to save bandwidth and provide more flexible management of public keys, lots of identity-based multi-proxy signature schemes [13, [27] [28] [29] , identity-based proxy multi-signature schemes [28, [30] [31] [32] [33] and identity-based multi-proxy multi-signature schemes [28, [34] [35] [36] [37] have been proposed. The notion of identity-based cryptography was introduced by Shamir [38] , and since the realization of elliptic curve pairings, there has been a huge increase in implementations of identity-based signatures. The majority of identity-based multi-proxy signature, proxy multi-signature and multi-proxy multi-signature schemes proposed have relied on pairings. While extensive research has led to vast improvements in implementation of pairings, their computational cost is necessarily higher than for more traditional public key algorithms which use exponentiation in various groups. Moreover, pairing-based cryptosystems rely on newer computational assumptions in their security analysis. There has been a proliferation of pairing-based assumptions whose difficulty is not widely understood and whose connection to established assumptions, and to each other, remains unknown. Therefore, when designing new identity-based multi-proxy signatures, proxy multi-signatures and multi-proxy multi-signatures it is desirable to diversify the computational assumptions and to use widely accepted assumptions where possible.
Without incorporating bilinear pairings, Tiwari and Padhye proposed an identity-based proxy multisignature scheme [33] in 2011, and an identity-based multi-proxy multi-signature scheme [37] was proposed by Tiwari et al. in 2012 . In this study, first we show that identity-based proxy multi-signature [33] and multiproxy multi-signature [37] are not secure in their security models. Then, we propose the first identity-based multi-proxy multi-signature scheme from RSA, without bilinear pairings, where identity-based multi-proxy signature and proxy multi-signature schemes are special cases of it. The proposal and its special cases are the sequential aggregation of GQ identity-based signature [39] or GQ identity-based multi-signature with GQ identity-based multi-signature, which is a different version of identity-based multi-signature from RSA [40] proposed by Neven and Bellare in the number of interactions and random oracles. Furthermore, we show that the scheme is secure under one-wayness of the RSA problem in the random oracle model [41] by proposing a Forking Lemma suitable for our construction. We should highlight that the general Forking Lemma [42] cannot be applied directly into our scheme since this scheme is the result of sequential aggregation of two different signatures such that we have two different types of random oracle responses. Hence, we need to consider the probability of happening some random responses before the forking point in the proposed forking lemma, and this is the main difference of our Forking Lemma from previous ones.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the RSA complexity assumption employed as the signature foundation and the model of identity-based multi-proxy signature, proxy multi-signature and multi-proxy multi-signature schemes including their outline and security properties. Review and security analysis of the identity-based proxy multi-signature [33] and the multi-proxy multi-signature [37] without bilinear pairings are given in Section 3. Our proposed scheme and its formal security proof are presented in Section 4. The generalization of our security proof is given in Section 5. Sections 6 and 7 present the concluding remarks and conclusion, respectively.
-DelegationGen: This algorithm employs the StandardSign or MSign algorithm depending on the type of signature scheme to generate a delegation after some interactions between original signer(s) and proxy signer(s). In case of having (multi)-proxy multi-signature, the delegation is a multi-signature generated by original signers in the original group, otherwise, it is a standard signature of an original signer on the warrant. In case of StandardSign algorithm, x u is the secret key of the original signer, x o , and the message m is warrant (w||11), while in case of MSign algorithm x uj is the secret key of an original signer x oj , for 1 ≤ j ≤ d, the message m is warrant (w||11) and additional inputs Inp co−os generated by other co-original signers, where w includes the identity (identities) of proxy signer(s), the type of the delegated information and the period of delegation.
-The three following pairs of interactive protocols (algorithms) and algorithm are MProxySign and MProxyVer for identity-based multi-proxy signature scheme, ProxyMSign and ProxyMVer for proxy multisignature or MProxyMSign and MProxyMVer for multi-proxy multi-signature scheme, depending on the type of signature scheme.
• MProxySign: This is an interactive protocol in which each proxy signer with identity ID pi , 1 ≤ i ≤ n takes as input the system's parameter P ara, the master public key mpk, the proxy signers' identities ID p1 , ..., ID pn , original signer's identity ID o , the warrant w, the delegation σ o , its secret key x pi , additional inputs Inp co−ps of other proxy signers in the proxy agent and the message m to be signed, then, it outputs the identity-based multi-proxy signature θ on behalf of the original signer after a number of interactions with other proxy signers, i.e. θ ← M P roxySign(P ara, mpk, ID o , ID p1 , ..., ID pn , w, σ o , x pi , Inp co−ps , m||01).
• MProxyVer: This algorithm takes as input the system's parameter P ara, the master public key mpk, the original signer's identity ID o , the proxy signers' identities ID p1 , ..., ID pn , the warrant w, the signed message m and the multi-proxy signature θ, then, it outputs 1 if θ is a valid identity-based multi-proxy signature of the message m and outputs 0 otherwise, i.e. {0, 1} ← M P roxyV er(P ara, mpk, ID o , ID p1 , ..., ID pn , w, m||01, θ).
• ProxyMSign: This algorithm takes as input the system's parameter P ara, the master public key mpk, original signers' identities ID o1 , ..., ID o d , proxy signer's identity ID p , the warrant w, the delegation σ o , secret key x p of the proxy signer with identity ID p and the message m to be signed, then, it outputs the identity-based proxy multi-signature θ on behalf of the original signers, i.e. θ ← P roxyM Sign(P ara, mpk, ID o1 , ..., ID o d , ID p , w, σ o , x p , m||01).
• ProxyMVer: This algorithm takes as input the system's parameter P ara, the master public key mpk, the original signers' identities ID o1 , ..., ID o d , the proxy signer's identity ID p , the warrant w, the signed message m and the proxy multi-signature θ, then, it outputs 1 if θ is a valid identity-based proxy multi-signature of the message m and outputs 0 otherwise, i.e. {0, 1} ← P roxyM V er(P ara, mpk, ID o1 , ..., ID o d , ID p , w, m||01, θ).
• MProxyMSign: This is an interactive protocol in which each proxy signer with identity ID pi , 1 ≤ i ≤ n takes as input the system's parameter P ara, the master public key mpk, original signers' identities ID o1 , ...ID o d , proxy signers' identities ID p1 ..., ID pn , the warrant w, the delegation σ o , its secret key x pi , additional inputs Inp co−ps of other proxy signers in the proxy group and the message m to be signed, then, it outputs the identity-based multi-proxy multi-signature θ on behalf of original signers after a number of interactions with other proxy signers, i.e. θ ← M P roxyM Sign(P ara, mpk, ID o1 , ...ID o d , ID p1 ..., ID pn , w, σ o , x pi , Inp co−ps , m||01).
• MProxyMVer: This algorithm takes as input the system's parameter P ara, the master public key mpk, the original signers' identities ID o1 , ..., ID o d , the proxy signers' identities ID p1 , ..., ID pn , the warrant w, the signed message m and the multi-proxy multi-signature θ, then, it outputs 1 if θ is a valid identity-based multi-proxy multi-signature of the message m and outputs 0 otherwise, i.e. {0, 1} ← M P roxyM V er(P ara, mpk, ID o1 , ...ID o d , ID p1 ..., ID pn , w, m||01, θ).
2.3 Security models of identity-based multi-proxy signature, proxy multi-signature and multi-proxy multi-signature schemes
In a warrant-based identity-based multi-proxy signature, proxy multi-signature and multi-proxy multi-signature, the delegation is the original signer's standard signature (original signers' multi-signature) on the warrant w which contains information regarding the proxy agent such as the proxy agent's identity (identities), the period of validity, the restriction on the class of messages for which the warrant is valid. Therefore, the properties of strong identifiability, strong undeniability, verifiability, and prevention of misuse are satisfied naturally. Therefore, the signature scheme should be secure against existential forgery under an adaptivechosen-message, an adaptive-chosen warrant and chosen identity attack.
To have the strongest security notion possible and at the same time avoid making security proof unnecessarily complicated, we use single-signer setup, in which each signing oracle simulates the role of only one honest signer, with only one honest signer in the security model as it is a folklore and well-accepted in the literature [13, 29-33, 36, 37] . The adversary A can choose the identities on which it wants to forge a proxy signature and can request the secret keys corresponding to them (corrupted users) except for the honest signer, and also A can make delegation and proxy signature queries on arbitrary warrants and messages under arbitrary identities including only one honest identity.
To achieve existential unforgeability, three types of potential adversaries are considered. Adversaries of type I which only have identities of original and proxy signers, adversaries of type II which have secret keys of all proxy signers in addition to capabilities of adversaries of type I and adversaries of type III which have secret keys of all original signers in addition to identities of original and proxy signers.
Since an identity-based proxy signature scheme secure against type II (or type III) adversaries is also secure against type I adversaries we will henceforth only consider type II and type III adversaries. To have a formal definition for strong unforgeability, the following game between the challenger C and the adversary A is considered to be played [13] .
1. Setup: C runs the P araGen algorithm with a security parameter l to obtain system's parameter para and the master key (mpk, msk), then it sends (mpk, para) to A.
2.
The adversary A issues a polynomially bounded number of queries to the following oracles adaptively.
-KeyExtract queries: A can ask for the secret key corresponding to an identity ID u , then C returns the private key x u with running the KeyExtract algorithm.
-DelegationGen queries: If the scheme is proxy multi-signature or multi-proxy multi-signature, this kind of query is MSign query, otherwise, this kind of query is StandardSign query.
• StandardSign queries: Adversary A can request the StandardSign algorithm under the identity ID u on the message m of its choice. Then, C returns σ u ← StandardSign(P ara, mpk, m, x u ) to A. Especially, if ID u = ID o , A can choose m = (w||11) to attain a delegation σ o on a warrant w.
• MSign queries: Adversary A can request the multi-signature σ u of m w.r.t. identities ID u1 , ..., ID u d to C. In response, C firstly runs the KeyExtract algorithm to obtain the secret key, x ut , corresponding to the identity of the honest signer, ID ut . Next, C runs MSign protocol to generate a multi-signature σ u ← M Sign(P ara, mpk, m, x ut , ID u1 , ...ID u d , Inp co−us ) for 1 ≤ t ≤ d, and returns σ u to the adversary A, where Inp co−us is generated by A since it is assumed that other signers are corrupted. Especially, if the multi-set of identities are identities of original signers, A can choose m = (w||11), and also plays the role of other co-original signers to attain a delegation σ o on a warrant w under identities ID o1 , ..., ID o d .
-In case of multi-proxy signature, proxy multi-signature and multi-proxy multi-signature, we have items (a), (b) and (c), respectively.
(a) MProxySign queries: Adversary A can request the multi-proxy signature of (w, m) w.r. The formal definition of existential unforgeability for adversaries of type III is expressed in Definition 2.
Definition 2. An identity-based proxy signature is (t, q h , q H , q E , q s , )-existentially unforgeable against adaptive chosen message (chosen warrant) attack and chosen identity attack if there is no adversary which runs in time at most t, (makes at most q H + q h queries to hash functions), makes at most q E KeyExtract queries and q s MProxyMSign (MProxySign or ProxyMsign) queries, can win the aforementioned game with probability at least .
Identity-based (multi)-proxy multi-signature schemes without bilinear pairings
In this section, first we review efficient identity-based (multi)-proxy multi-signature schemes [33, 37] without bilinear pairings, then, we show that these schemes are not secure in their security model.
Overview of Tiwari et al.'s identity-based multi-proxy multi-signature scheme
In 2012, Tiwari et al. [37] proposed an identity-based multi-proxy multi-signature without bilinear pairings to improve the efficiency of these kinds of schemes. This scheme includes a set of d original signers ID o1 , ..., ID o d , a set of n proxy signers ID p1 , ..., ID pn and a clerk. Their scheme consists of following algorithms:
1. Setup: The system parameters are as follows. Let H 1 : {0, 1} * ×G → Z * α and H 2 : {0, 1} * → Z * be random oracles, where p is a l-bit prime determining tuples F p , E/F p , G, P , where E/F p denotes an elliptic curve E over a prime finite field F p defined by equation y 2 = x 3 + ax + b for a and b ∈ F p and discriminant ∆ = 4a 3 + 27b 2 = 0. Let G be a cyclic additive group with order α, and P be the generator of G. The key distribution center chooses x ∈ R Z * α and computes the master public key P pub = xP . It publishes mpk = P pub as the master public key, and keeps the master secret key msk = x secret. Therefore, public parameters are P ara = {H 1 , H 2 , F p , E/F p , G, P } and mpk.
2. KeyExtract: On input master secret key msk = x and the user identity ID u , the key distribution center chooses at random r u ∈ Z * α , computes R u = r u P , h u = H 1 (ID u , R u ) and x u = r u + h u x, and sends the user secret key (x u , R u ) over a secure and authenticated channel to the user with identity ID u .
3. DelegationGen: Let w be the warrant to be signed by all original signers with identities ID o1 , ..., ID o d who want to delegate their signing right to a group of proxy signers with the identities ID p1 , ..., ID pn , the delegation is ((K oj , R oj ), (K pi , R pi ), K, σ), 1 ≤ i ≤ n and 1 ≤ j ≤ d, which is generated as follows.
-For 1 ≤ j ≤ d, the original signer with identity ID oj chooses k oj $ ← Z * α , computes K oj = k oj P , and broadcasts K oj to d − 1 original signers, n proxy signers and the clerk C. Similarly, for 1 ≤ i ≤ n, the proxy signer with identity ID pi chooses k pi $ ← Z * α , computes K pi = k pi P , and broadcasts K pi to n − 1 proxy signers, d original signers and the clerk C.
-The clerk C and all signers compute K =
-For 1 ≤ i ≤ n, the proxy signer with identity ID pi computes σ pi = e pi x pi + k pi , where e pi = H 1 (w, K pi , K), and broadcast σ pi to the clerk C. Similarly, for 1 ≤ j ≤ d, the original signer with identity ID oj computes σ oj = e oj x oj + k oj , where e oj = H 1 (w, K oj , K), and broadcast σ oj to the clerk C.
1 σ oj , and broadcasts σ to all original and proxy signers. Therefore, the delegation is 
-For 1 ≤ i ≤ n, the proxy signer with identity ID pi chooses a i $ ← Z * α , computes N i = a i P , and broadcasts N i to n − 1 proxy signers. -For 1 ≤ i ≤ n, the proxy signer with identity
1 ≤ i ≤ n and 1 ≤ j ≤ d on the warrant w to the clerk, the clerk first verifies the validity of the delegation by checking if σP =
When all individual proxy signatures are valid, the multi-proxy multi-signature can be generated as 
Security analysis of Tiwari et al.'s identity-based multi-proxy multi-signature scheme
Tiwari et al.'s scheme is forgeable by original signers, the clerk or everyone who has a valid delegation. Note that delegations are public in the scheme. This security drawback is the result of not employing proxy signers' secret keys in MProxyMSign algorithm to generate multi-proxy multi-signatures on different messages in the warrant w.
The scenario of this attack is as follows. Original signers, the clerk or an adversary with having a valid delegation ((K oj , R oj ), (K pi , R pi ), K, σ), 1 ≤ i ≤ n and 1 ≤ j ≤ d can generate valid multi-proxy multi-signatures on arbitrary messages in the warrant w. The adversary first chooses a ∈ R Z * α , then, computes N = a P , h = H 2 (m , N , K) and s = a + nh σ. The forged signature is θ = ((K oj , R oj ), (K pi , R pi ), K, σ, N , s ), 1 ≤ i ≤ n and 1 ≤ j ≤ d under the warrant w on the message m in the warrant w. Hence, the first two conditions in the MProxyMVer algorithm are held since the forgery was performed for the arbitrary message m in the warrant w, and also the valid delegation shows authorization of proxy signers with identities ID p1 , ..., ID pn by original signers with identities ID o1 , ..., ID o d in the warrant w. Furthermore, the verifi-
holds for the the forged signature θ since it is generated according to the scheme, where
since the delegation is valid and was obtained by the adversary or the clerk, or was generated by the original signers.
If we consider a condition in MProxyMVer algorithm such that each verifier checks if N equals the summation of N i to prevent from the aforementioned attack, where N i indicates the identity of each proxy signer through an authenticated broadcast primitive, we cannot make the scheme resistant against this attack.
With this condition in the verification of each multi-proxy multi-signature, the clerk can still forge valid signatures on different messages in the warrant after generation of a valid multi-proxy multi-signature. Since for this forgery attack the clerk needs some components (s i , N ), 1 ≤ i ≤ n of a valid multi-proxy multi-signature in addition to the delegation. After creation of a valid multi-proxy multi-signature, the clerk knows the tuple (m, N, σ, K, s i ). Next, the clerk computes a i = s i − σH 2 (m, N, K) for 1 ≤ i ≤ n. Then, it can generate valid multi-proxy multi-signatures on arbitrary messages in the warrant w with computing a = i a i , N = aP , h = H 2 (m , N, K) and s = a + nh σ. Hence, the forged signature is θ = ((K oj , R oj ), (K pi , R pi ), K, σ, N, s ). Sine the delegation is valid, we have σP = d 1 (e oj (R oj +h oj P pub )+K oj )+ n 1 (e pi (R pi +h pi P pub )+K pi ) and consequently, the verification equation
Since previous N i of a valid signature are used by the clerk to generate a forgery, the new condition is held. Therefore, with the condition of checking if N in the signature equals the summation of N i , where N i indicates the identity of each proxy signer through an authenticated broadcast primitive, the proposed scheme cannot be secure against the mentioned forgery attack.
Overview of Tiwari and Padhye's identity-based proxy multi-signature scheme
In 2011, Tiwari and Padhye [33] proposed an identity-based proxy multi-signature without bilinear pairings to improve efficiency of these kinds of schemes. This scheme includes a set of d original signers with identities ID o1 , ..., ID o d , a proxy signer with identity ID p and a clerk. Their scheme consists of following algorithms:
1. Setup: The system parameters are as follows. Let H 1 : {0, 1} * → Z * α and H 2 : {0, 1} * ×G → Z * be random oracles, where p is a l-bit prime determining tuples F p , E/F p , G, P , where E/F p denotes an elliptic curve E over a prime finite field F p defined by equation y 2 = x 3 + ax + b for a and b ∈ F p and discriminant ∆ = 4a 3 + 27b 2 = 0. Let G be a cyclic additive group with order α, and P be the generator of G. The key distribution center chooses x ∈ R Z * α and computes the master public key P pub = xP . It publishes mpk = P pub as the master public key, and keeps the master secret key msk = x secret. Therefore, public parameters are P ara = {H 1 , H 2 , F p , E/F p , G, P } and mpk.
2. KeyExtract: On input master secret key msk = x and an identity ID u , the key distribution center chooses at random r u ∈ Z * α , computes R u = r u P , h u = H 1 (ID u , R u ) and x u = r u + h u x, and sends the user secret key (x u , R u ) over a secure and authenticated channel to the user with identity ID u .
3. DelegationGen: Let w be the warrant to be signed by all original signers with identities ID o1 , ..., ID o d who want to delegate their signing right to a proxy signer with identity ID p , the delegation is y = {σ oj , K oj }, 1 ≤ j ≤ d which is generated as follows.
-For 1 ≤ j ≤ d, the original signer with identity ID oj chooses k oj $ ← Z * α , and computes K oj = k oj P . -For 1 ≤ j ≤ d, the original signer with identity ID oj computes σ oj = e oj x oj + k oj mod α, where e oj = H 1 (w, K oj , ID p ), and sends y = {σ oj , K oj }, 1 ≤ j ≤ d to the proxy signer with identity ID p . 
Security analysis of Tiwari and Padhye's identity-based proxy multi-signature scheme
Tiwari and Padhye's scheme is forgeable in their proposed security model [33] . Since in their security model [33] they assumed that adversaries (original signers) in addition to having access to the KeyExtract algorithm on input ID u , the DelegationGen algorithm on input (w, ID p , ID o1 , ..., ID o d ) and the ProxyMSign algorithm on input (w, m, ID p , ID o1 , ..., ID o d ), have access to the proxy signing key generation oracle, PKGen, of proxy signers on input (ID p , y , .) to obtain D p , where ID p is proxy signer's identity, ID o1 , ..., ID o d are identities of original signers, y is a valid delegation, and w and m are the warrant and the message in the warrant, respectively. Note that outputs of the KeyExtract, DelegationGen and ProxyMSign algorithm are x u , y and θ, respectively. They also assumed that for a forged proxy multi-signature θ under identities ID p and ID o1 , ..., ID o d including a delegation y, the adversaries (the original signers) that do not have proxy signer's long term secret key x p , are not allowed to make query to the proxy signing key generation oracle, PKGen, on input (ID p , y, .) to obtain D p , make KeyExtract query on input ID p to obtain x p , and make a ProxyMSign query on input (w, m, ID p , ID o1 , ..., ID o d ) to attain θ . Note that the delegation y is generated by original signers or adversaries obtained it with making query to the DelegationGen oracle.
To forge the proxy multi-signature θ including the delegation y regarding to adversary's capabilities in having access to oracles in their security model, the adversaries (the original signers) first make a query to the proxy signing key generation oracle, PKGen, on input (ID p , y , .) to obtain D p , where y = {σ oj , K oj }, 1 ≤ j ≤ d is a valid delegation on w and y = y . Next, the adversaries (the original signers) can extract long term secret key, x p , of the proxy signer with identity ID p with computing
, where D p is the response of PKGen on input (ID p , y , .) and
Then, the original signers or the adversaries with having the delegation y and long term secret key, x p , of the proxy signer with identity ID p can generate valid identity-based proxy multi-signatures on different messages in the warrant as follows. The original signers or the adversaries with the delegation y = {σ oj , K oj }, 1 ≤ j ≤ d generate the proxy signing key with computing D p = d 1 (σ oj + x p e pj ), where e pj = H 1 (w, K oj , ID oj ) for 1 ≤ j ≤ d. Next, they choose b $ ← Z * α , and compute R = b P and h = H 2 (m , R ), then check if gcd(b + h , α) = 1 holds. If it does, they continue, otherwise, they choose another b . Then, they compute s = (b + h ) −1 D p mod α and the resulting signature is θ = (R oj , K oj , R p , R , s ), 1 ≤ j ≤ d which passes the verification equation since it is generated according to the scheme. Note that in the proposed forgery attack the original signers or the adversaries with the delegation y = {σ oj , K oj }, 1 ≤ j ≤ d did not make a query to the proxy signing key generation oracle, PKGen, on input (ID p , y, .) to obtain D p , did not make KeyExtract query on input ID p to obtain x p , and did not make a ProxyMSign query on input (w, m, ID p , ID o1 , ..., ID o d ) to attain θ .
4 Our identity-based multi-proxy signature, proxy multi-signature and multi-proxy multi-signature schemes
In this section, we present an identity-based multi-proxy multi-signature scheme based on the GQ identitybased signature scheme [39] . Since identity-based proxy multi-signature and multi-proxy signature schemes are special cases of the proposed scheme such that d = 1 for the former and n = 1 in the latter, we omit their details. Then, we prove that the identity-based multi-proxy multi-signature scheme is secure under onewayness of RSA in the random oracle model. Similarly, one may show that its special cases are secure in the random oracle model. To give some intuition into our schemes, we briefly recall the GQ scheme [39] here. The key distribution center generates an RSA module N and exponents (e, d) such that ed = 1 mod ϕ(N ). The master public key is the pair (N, e), while d is the master secret key. The signature on a message m by identity ID u is a pair (R u , s u ) such that R u = r e u mod N , where r u is a random number, and s
Our scheme employs GQ identity-based multi-signature scheme, which is a different version of identitybased multi-signature from RSA [40] proposed by Neven and Bellare in the number of interactions and random oracles, as a building block such that the delegation is the original signers' GQ multi-signature on a warrant and the proxy signature is sequential aggregation of delegation and proxy agent's GQ identity-based multi-signature on a message m.
Details of identity-based multi-proxy multi-signature scheme
In this section, we present the details of identity-based multi-proxy multi-signature scheme. There are n+d+1 participants in the system, a group of original signers with identity set ID o = ID o1 , ..., ID o d , a group of proxy signers with identity set ID p = ID p1 , ..., ID pn and a clerk, where d is the number of original signers in the original signers' group and n is the number of proxy signers in the proxy group. Our scheme consists of seven algorithms as follows.
1. Setup: The system parameters are as follows. Let l 1 and l N ∈ N and let H 1 : {0, 1} * → {0, 1} l1 , and H : {0, 1} * → Z * N be random oracles, where H depends on the master public key of the scheme. Let KG rsa be a RSA key pair generator that outputs triplets (N, e, d) such that ϕ(N ) > 2 l N and with prime encryption exponent e of length strictly greater than l 1 + 2 log n 2 + log d 2 bits. The key distribution center runs KG rsa to generate RSA parameters (N, e, d). It publishes mpk = (N, e) as the master public key, and keeps the master secret key msk = d secret. Therefore, public parameters are P ara = {H 1 , H} and mpk.
2. KeyExtract: On input master secret key msk = d and the user identity ID u , the key distribution center computes x u = H(ID u ) d mod N , and sends the user secret key x u over a secure and authenticated channel to the user with identity ID u .
3. MSign: Let m be a message to be signed with signers whose identity set is ID u = ID u1 , ..., ID u d , the signature σ u is generated as follows: 
When all partial proxy signatures are valid, the identity-based multi-proxy multi-signature of the message m under the warrant w w.r.t. identity sets ID o for original signers and ID p for proxy signers is generated as θ = (R p , R o , s p ) by computing s p = n i=1ŝ i .
7.
MProxyMVer: Given identity set ID o of original signers and identity set ID p of proxy signers, a warrant w, a message m, and a signature θ = (R p , R o , s p ), a verifier operates as follows: -Checks if the message m conforms to the warrant w, otherwise, it stops.
-Checks if n proxy signers with identity set ID p are authorized by original signers with identity set ID o in the warrant w, otherwise, it stops. -Accepts the multi-proxy multi-signature if and only if s
Analysis of the proposed schemes
In this section, we verify the correctness and prove existential unforgeability of the new identity-based multiproxy multi-signature scheme in the random oracle model (see [41] for the background). Note that one may similarly verify the correctness and prove unforgeability of other schemes, namely proxy multi-signature and multi-proxy signature schemes, since they are special cases of the identity-based multi-proxy multi-signature scheme.
In order to prove unforgeability of the proposed scheme, we need to show that it is unforgeable against adversaries of types II and III (as defined in Section 2.3). Since our security proofs are quite similar in both cases, we have parameterized these proofs to prevent unnecessary repetitions of arguments. Hence, just for notational settings, we refer to the adversary as A (1−k)II+kIII in which the parameter k ∈ {0, 1} makes the difference between adversaries of types II and III (i.e. notationally we assume that we have an adversary of type II, A II , when k = 0 and an adversary of type III, A III , when k = 1). Note that, the proofs for different values of k are independent.
In the security proof, it is assumed that there is only one honest signer, and note that, this does not have any effect on the generality of our proof. Also, this assumption in different security models is in coherence with what is usually considered in the current literature (e.g. see [13, 29-33, 36, 37] for similar issues) since security of the general case of having multiple honest signers follows from the security of the extreme case of having only one honest signer in a more or less straightforward way. Although, this fact is not usually explicitly stated in this literature, to be precise, we have decided to elaborate on the details of this proof in Section 5.
To prove the security of our proposed scheme, and by contradiction, assuming an adversary A (1−k)II+kIII , we show that there is a solver (algorithm B) that can solve a random instance of the RSA problem with a nonnegligible probability. To do this, we first show that there exists a simulator called C A (1−k)II+kIII (see Algorithm 2) that can simulate the signature scheme without knowing the secret key of the honest signer, and runs the adversary A (1−k)II+kIII as its sub-routine. In this regard, we compute the run-time and a lower-bound for the success (returning a useful output (R p , R o , s p , c k , c 1−k , x o , x p , m, w) (see Definition 3)) probability of this simulator in terms of the run-time and success (returning a valid forgery θ = (R p , R o , s p , c k , c 1−k ) on a message m under the warrant w with respect to the original signers' identity set ID o and the proxy signers' identity set ID p ) probability of the adversary and the number of queries to the oracles (see Lemma 1) .
At the final stage, we use a forking strategy to solve an instance (N, e, y) of the RSA problem, using a useful pair (see Definition 4) of the simulator C A (1−k)II+kIII when the random string used in both simulations are the same. Hence, we concentrate on computing a lower bound for the probability of producing such a useful pair and solving the RSA instance as the main body of the solver algorithm B (see Lemma 3) . We should highlight that the general Forking Lemma [42] cannot be applied directly into our scheme since this scheme is the result of sequential aggregation of two different signatures such that we have two different types of random oracle responses. Hence, we need to consider the probability of happening some random responses before the forking point in the proposed forking lemma, and this is the main difference of our Forking Lemma from previous ones.
Our main result on the security of the proposed scheme is summarized in Theorem 1, where the parameter k is used to code the result for both adversaries of types II and III.
To start let us verify the correctness of the proposed scheme. Note that, all computations are done modulo N , but we omit this for simplicity.
Definition 3. Let k ∈ {0, 1} be a constant and the algorithm
Lemma 1. Let k ∈ {0, 1}, n ≥ 1 and d ≥ 1 be constants and l N be a security parameter. Assuming the existence of an adversary, A (1−k)II+kIII , with success probability at least and run-time t, there exists a simulator C A (1−k)II+kIII for the signature scheme that does not use the secret key of the honest signer, and produces a useful output (R p , R o , s p , c k , c 1−k , x o , x p , m, w) (see Algorithm 2 for the pseudocode and the definitions) such that, a) the success probability of C A (1−k)II+kIII is greater than
where t exp is the time of one exponentiation in Z * N , and q H , q h , q E , q d and q s are the number of queries to the oracles H 1 , H, KeyExtract, DelegationGen and MProxyMSign, respectively.
Proof. Assume the existence of an adversary A (1−k)II+kIII on the public data mpk = (N, e) which runs in time at most t, makes q H queries to the random oracle H 1 , q h queries to the random oracle H, q E queries to the KeyExtract, (1 − k)q d queries to the DelegationGen and kq s queries to the MProxyMSign algorithm, and can win the unforgeability game with probability at least . The algorithm C A (1−k)II+kIII maintains initially empty associative arrays T 1 [.] and T [.], and answers A (1−k)II+kIII 's oracle queries as described below (see Algorithm 2 and note that this algorithm uses the adversary A (1−k)II+kIII and Algorithm 1 as its sub-routines).
-
l1 , and returns
-H(ID u ) queries: We employ Coron's technique [43] to obtain a tighter security bound when simulating H. -DelegationGen queries for a warrant w w.r.t. the multi-set ID o of original signers including one honest original signer whose identity is denoted as ID ot : The algorithm C A II first makes query to H oracle
−c0 mod N , and broadcasts the value of R t of the honest original signer. The algorithm C A II at the same time receives R j , 1 ≤ j = t ≤ d, of other corrupted original signers from A II (the adversary plays the role of the corrupted co-original signers with having their secret keys in the group of original signers), and computes
] has already been defined, then C A II sets bad DG ← true and halts returning ⊥; otherwise, it sets
If not, it ends the signing protocol. Otherwise, it computes s o = d j=1 s j , and returns the signature σ o = (R o , s o , c 0 ) as a delegation to the adversary A II .
-MProxyMSign queries for a message m under the warrant w w.r.t. proxy signers' identity set ID p including one honest proxy signer whose identity is denoted as ID pt such that m and ID p are in the warrant w:
The algorithm C A III receives σ o = (R o , s o , c 0 ) as a delegation from A III , which generates it by itself since it has secret keys of all original signers. Next, if the delegation is valid, C A III makes query to the
mod N for the honest proxy signer, and broadcasts R t . The algorithm C A III at the same time receives R i , 1 ≤ i = t ≤ n, of corrupted proxy signers from A III , which has their secret keys, and plays the role of the corrupted co-proxy signers, and computes
] has already been defined, then, C A III sets bad M P ← true and halts returning ⊥; otherwise, it sets 
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A (1−k)II+kIII 's KeyExtract, DelegationGen and MProxyMSign queries, respectively. These probabilities are computed as follows.
Proof. Pr[¬bad KE ] is the probability that C A (1−k)II+kIII does not abort as a result of A (1−k)II+kIII 's KeyExtract queries. The algorithm C A (1−k)II+kIII aborts at answering to a KeyExtract query when bad KE is set to true (Algorithm 2, Line 26) which means that b = 1 for a given identity. The probability of this event is 1 − β, so the probability that C A (1−k)II+kIII does not abort for one KeyExtract query is β. Since A (1−k)II+kIII makes at most q E KeyExtract queries, the probability that C A (1−k)II+kIII does not abort as a result of q E KeyExtract queries is at least β q E . for these kinds of queries and the number of R o , uniformly distributed in Z N , is 2 l N , the probability of this event for one DelegationGen query is at most (q d + q H )2 −l N . Hence, the probability of this event for q d queries is at most
In addition, this probability includes the probability that C A II previously used the same randomness R t , uniformly distributed in Z N , in one DelegationGen simulation. Since there are at most q d DelegationGen simulations, this probability is at most q d 2 −l N . Therefore, for q d DelegationGen queries the probability of this event is at most q
Proof. Events ¬bad KE and ¬bad M P are independent, so Pr[¬bad M P |¬bad KE ] = Pr[¬bad M P ]. The value of Pr[¬bad M P ] is the probability that C A III does not abort as a result of MProxyMSign queries. The algorithm C A III aborts at answering to a MProxyMSign query if bad M P is set to true (Algorithm 2, Line 46) which means that there is a conflict in table T 1 [.] for these kinds of queries. The probability of finding a conflict in T 1 [.] for one MProxyMSign query equals the probability that (R p ||R o || ID o || ID p ||w||m||01) generated in MProxyMSign simulation has been occurred by chance in a previous query to the oracle H 1 . Since there are at most q H + q s entries in the table T 1 [.] for these kinds of queries and the number of R p , uniformly distributed in Z N , is 2 l N , the probability of this event for one MProxyMSign is at most (q s + q H )2 −l N . Hence, the probability of this event for q s queries is at most q s (q s + q H )2 −l N . In addition, this probability includes the probability that C A III previously used the same randomness R t , uniformly distributed in Z N , in one MProxyMSign simulation. Since there are at most q s MProxyMSign simulations, this probability is at most q s 2 −l N . Therefore, for q s MProxyMSign queries the probability of this event is at most q
Finally, it is assumed that A (1−k)II+kIII outputs a valid forgery θ = (R p , R o , s p , c k , c 1−k ) on a message m under a warrant w w.r.t. original signers' identity set ID o and proxy signers' identity set ID p with probability at least in time bound t. Since the forgery is valid, we have
and A II has not asked the warrant w from DelegationGen algorithm under original signer's identity set ID o and A III has not asked the message m from MProxyMSign algorithm under proxy signer's identity set ID p . In addition, a valid forgery has to contain at least one uncorrupted identity. The probability that A (1−k)II+kIII outputs a valid forgery containing at least one uncorrupted identity is computed as follows.
Claim 4. The probability that A (1−k)II+kIII outputs a valid forgery including at least one uncorrupted identity is at least (1 − β).
Proof. It is assumed that A (1−k)II+kIII outputs a valid forgery with probability at least . The probability that a valid forgery contains at least one uncorrupted identity is at least 1 − β. The probability of existence of one honest identity with b = 1 is 1 − β, and for adversaries of type II the probability of existence of at least one uncorrupted identity among d + n identities is 1 − β d (since A II has secret keys of n proxy signers, we have at most d uncorrupted identities in the forgery). Since we have 1 − β ≤ 1 − β d for d ≥ 1, this probability is at least 1 − β. Similarly we have the same claim for A III . Therefore, the probability that A (1−k)II+kIII outputs a valid forgery containing at least one uncorrupted identity is at least (1 − β) .
Therefore, the probability that C A (1−k)II+kIII returns a useful output is at least ( 
With substituting the value of β, we obtain
1+q E is a monotonically increasing sequence for q E ≥ 1. Therefore, the lower bound of
To estimate the required time of C A (1−k)II+kIII in returning a useful output, the required time t C in which C A (1−k)II+kIII answers A (1−k)II+kIII 's queries is computed as follows. Since it is assumed that a (multi-) exponentiation in Z N takes time t exp , while all other operations take zero time, each random oracle or KeyExtract query takes at most one exponentiation, a delegation simulation takes 2d exponentiations, and a multi-proxy multi-signature simulation takes 2(n + 1) exponentiations, we therefore have
Finally, C A (1−k)II+kIII performs additional random oracle queries H(ID u ) for identities in the forgery to find 
x pi , the above relation converts to
Also, in what follows we will be needing the following splitting lemma.
then the following statements hold: Forking Lemma) . Let k ∈ {0, 1} be a constant, l 1 be a security parameter, H 1 be a random oracle, and q t be the total number of queries to H 1 . It is assumed that C A (1−k)II+kIII returns a useful output (R p , R o , s p , c k , c 1−k , x o , x p , m, w) with probability at least ε in time bound τ . Then, a replay of C A (1−k)II+kIII with the same random string and a different random oracle gives a useful pair in time t ≤ 2τ with probability ≥ Since H 1 is a random oracle, the probability of the event
and
is less than 2 −(l1−1) , unless they are asked during the attack. Hence, in what follows it is likely that queries
are asked during a successful attack. We assume that i 2 and i 1 are indices of these queries, respectively, and if these queries are never asked, we set i 1 = ∞ and i 2 = ∞. We define set Υ as the set of successful pairs (ω, ρ), Υ = {(ω, ρ)| C A (1−k)II+kIII (ω) produces a useful output & (i 1 , i 2 ) = (∞, ∞)}. The lower bound of probability of producing a useful output is 1 = Pr[Υ ] ≥ ε−2 −(l1−1) . Since C A (1−k)II+kIII makes query to the random oracle H 1 for Q i1 and Q i2 for a successful pair (ω, ρ) ∈ Υ , then we define set Υ i1,i2 as a subset of Υ in which query Q i1 was made to the oracle H 1 before query Q i2 which means i 1 < i 2 .
This gives us a partition of Υ in exactly
classes. Let I be the set consisting of most likely indices
With splitting the randomness ρ related to the oracle H 1 as (ρ , c k ), where ρ denotes answers of all queries to oracle H 1 except for query Q i2 , whose answer is denoted as c k (c 1−k is assigned to the response of Q i1 ). We employ splitting lemma, taking 
. Let ( i 1 , i 2 ) denote indices of a successful pair with probability at least 1 4 , ( i 1 , i 2 ) ∈ I and (ω, ρ ) ∈ Ω i1,i2 ∩ Υ i1,i2 . If B replays the attack with fixed (ω, ρ ) and a randomly chosen c k ∈ {0, 1} l1 , it gets another successful pair ((ω, ρ ), c k ) such that c k = c k with probability
2(qt)(qt−1) .
After two successful executions of C
. Note that since query Q i1 was made to the oracle H 1 before query Q i2 , we also have c 1−k = c 1−k .
Theorem 1.
If the RSA function associated to Kg rsa is (t , )-one-way, then the proposed scheme is (t, q h , q H , q E , (1 − k)q d , kq s , )-secure against the adversary A (1−k)II+kIII for a constant k ∈ {0, 1} such that
, t exp , l 1 and l N are the time of one exponentiation in Z * N and two security parameters, respectively. In addition, q H , q h , q E , q d and q s are the number of queries to oracles H 1 , H, KeyExtract, DelegationGen and MProxyMSign, respectively.
Proof. In the proof, we consider two cases for the forgery depending on the type of adversaries. In the first case, without loss of generality it is assumed that there is one honest original signer (type II adversary plus d − 1 corrupted original signers), while in the second one there is one honest proxy signer (type III adversary plus n − 1 corrupted proxy signers). Then, we show that the algorithm B can solve a random instance of the RSA problem (N, e, y) such that γ = y 1 e mod N . Case 1. In this case, we consider adversaries of type II (i.e., k = 0). According to Lemma 1,
x pi . Then, the algorithm B, the RSA solver, will produce a useful pair of ((R p , R o , s p , c 0 , c 1 , x o , x p , m, w) and
and q t = q d + q H (see Lemma 3) . Since a useful pair contains two useful outputs, we have
By dividing the two aforementioned equations, we have
Since c 0 = c 0 ∈ {0, 1} l1 , and e is a prime of length strictly greater than l 1 +log n 2 , we have e > n(c 0 −c 0 ) and therefore gcd(e, n(c 0 − c 0 )) = 1. Using the extended Euclidean algorithm, one can find a, b ∈ Z such that ae+bn(c 0 −c 0 ) = 1. Hence, we have y = y
Note that, since A II has secret keys of all proxy signers, there is no need to make any query to the MProxyMSign oracle.
Case 2. In this case, we consider adversaries of type III (i.e., k = 1). According to Lemma 1, C A III returns a useful output (R p , R o , s p , c 0 , c 1 , x o , x p , m, w) in time bound τ = t + (1q E + 1q h + 2(n + 1)q s )t exp with probability at least ε = 4q E − (2q
x pi . Then, the algorithm B, the RSA solver, produces a useful pair of ((R p , R o , s p , c 0 , c 1 , x o , x p , m, w) and
and q t = q s + q H (see Lemma 3) . Since a useful pair contains two useful outputs, we have
Since c 1 = c 1 ∈ {0, 1} l1 , and e is a prime of length strictly greater than l 1 , we have e > (c 1 − c 1 ) and therefore gcd(e, (c 1 − c 1 )) = 1. Using the extended Euclidean algorithm, one can find a, b ∈ Z such that ae + b(c 1 − c 1 ) = 1. Hence, we have y = y
Note that, since A III has secret keys of all original signers, there is no need to make any query to the DelegationGen oracle.
Security extension to multiple honest signers
In general, one may consider two scenarios in the security analysis of our schemes for the single signer setup: security analysis with one honest signer and with multiple honest signers. At first glance, it seems that the latter is a stronger security model than the former, however, in what follows we show that for our schemes both of them are equivalent.
In the security proof with having multiple honest signers, assuming an adversary A (1−k)II+kIII , with success probability at least and run-time t in returning a forgery containing kn max + (1 − k)d max honest signers (1 ≤ d max ≤ d and 1 ≤ n max ≤ n), we need to estimate the run-time and a lower-bound for the success probability of a simulator in returning a useful output in terms of the run-time, the success probability of the adversary and the number of oracles' queries. Then, using the forking strategy, there exists an algorithm that can solve the RSA problem with a non-negligible probability, which is a function of the number of queries and the simulator's success probability.
In what follows, we examine if having multiple honest signers in the forgery has any effect on the number of oracle queries and the simulator's run-time.
In the single-signer setup, either one of the oracles DelegationGen or MProxyMSign simulates the role of one single honest signer, and the adversary plays the role of other co-signers. In the second scenario, since other co-signers are not necessarily assumed to be corrupted, the adversary has to play the role of other honest signers without knowing their secret keys. Since the adversary can engage in each of these oracles with any honest identity that it chooses, the adversary can interact concurrently by DelegationGen under each honest original signer's identity with the same original signers' identity set and the warrant to simulate the role of other co-original signers, or it can interact concurrently by the MProxyMSign under each honest proxy signer's identity with the same proxy signers' identity set, the warrant and the same message to simulate the role of other co-proxy signers.
We note that -In both cases (k = 0 or k = 1), communication of the adversary with oracles (DelegationGen or MProxyMSign) is simulated in parallel (i.e. concurrent) time. Since the required time of signature simulation is the same as that in the first scenario, we have no extra penalty in the timing of returning a useful output.
-In both cases (k = 0 or k = 1), the result of making any number of queries to either one of the oracles DelegationGen or MProxyMSign on the same input under the identities of honest signers in the input to return a valid final output (a delegation or a proxy signature) to the adversary will give rise to at most one new entry in table T 1 [.] , and consequently in the total number of queries. Since the number of queries are the same as those in the first scenario, we will have no extra penalty in the success probability of returning a useful output. ). It has essentially noting to do with the time and the success probability of returning a useful pair, since the simulator's probability and the total number of queries in the second scenario are the same as those in the first scenario, and with the RSA solutions, and one may verify them as follows. A useful pair contains two useful outputs, we have Since kc 1 + (1 − k)c 0 = kc 1 + (1 − k)c 0 ∈ {0, 1} l1 , and e is a prime of length strictly greater than l 1 + 2 log 
Concluding remarks
In this section, first we discuss about the practicality of the scheme, and then compare it with existing schemes to show its efficiency.
Practicality. First, note that in our security proof, the probability estimates are far from being sharp. Hence, we expect higher security guarantees in real applications. However, to get a feeling about our main Theorem (Theorem 1) , we analyze a real setup in what follows. Considering adversaries of type III who can corrupt two users (i.e., q E = 2 and n = d = 3), the security result becomes ≥ 2 (1−2 −l 1 ) 2 9 (qs+q H )(qs+q H −1) . This result gives the exact relation between the security of the scheme and hardness of the RSA problem. This relation helps us choose the length of the keys to implement the scheme securely w.r.t. the best known algorithm which solves the RSA problem. The best way to solve the RSA problem is by factoring and the expected time to factor a l N −bit integer with Number Field Sieve, NFS, is O(exp(( Comparison. The comparison for some identity-based multi-proxy signature, proxy multi-signature and multi-proxy multi-signature schemes is summarized in Table 1 . The comparison is in terms of DeleGenCost, DeleVer-Cost, PSign-Cost and PVer-Cost, dominating computational cost in delegation generation per an original signer, delegation verification per a verifier, proxy signature generation per a proxy signer and proxy signature verification per a verifier, respectively. In Table 1 , P , E T , m G T , m G , E and MPS, PMS and MPMS denote the pairing evaluation, exponentiation in group G T , multiplication in G T , scalar multiplication in G, exponentiation in Z N , multi-proxy signature, proxy multi-signature and multi-proxy multi-signature, respectively. Note that, in comparison, it is assumed that other operations take zero time, n and d are the size of the proxy and original group, respectively, and also computational cost of the clerk is considered for users (original and proxy signers). In Table 1 , comparison of our schemes with some corresponding constructions, the latest provable secure schemes is given. As shown in Table 1 , our identity-based multi-proxy signature, proxy multi-signature and multi-proxy multi-signature schemes are more efficient than identity-based multi-proxy signature schemes [28, 13, 29] , identity-based proxy multi-signature schemes [28, [30] [31] [32] and identity-based multiproxy multi-signature schemes [28, [34] [35] [36] , respectively since the previous ones rely on elliptic curve pairings which are relatively expensive to implement (from [40] , we know that the cost of each pairing is roughly that of 6 − 20 exponentiations). In addition, our schemes rely on well-understood assumption (RSA assumption), while previous schemes are based on recently derived computational assumptions. Without incorporation bilinear pairings, two identity-based (multi)-proxy multi-signature schemes [33, 37] were proposed, while they are not secure in their security models as shown before, and also they are not efficient in terms of signature size.
Conclusion
In this paper, we showed that previous identity-based proxy multi-signature and multi-proxy multi-signature schemes without bilinear pairings are indeed insecure in their security models. Then, we presented the first provably secure identity-based multi-proxy multi-signature schemes from RSA assumption, without bilinear pairings, where identity-based multi-proxy signature and proxy multi-signature schemes are its special cases. To analyze security of our schemes, we proved a new Forking Lemma since the general Forking Lemma cannot be applied to them. These schemes are suitable for usage in resource-constraint devices to improve energy consumption which is a crucial factor for them.
